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Abstract
Population protocols have been introduced by Angluin et al. as a
model of networks consisting of very limited mobile agents that interact
in pairs but with no control over their own movement. A collection
of anonymous agents, modeled by finite automata, interact pairwise
according to some rules that update their states. Predicates on the
initial configurations that can be computed by such protocols have
been characterized as semi-linear predicates.
In an orthogonal way, several distributed systems have been termed
in literature as being realizations of games in the sense of game theory.
∗This work and all authors were partly supported by ANR Project SHAMAN, Xavier
Koegler was supported by the ANR projects ALADDIN and PROSE
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We investigate under which conditions population protocols, or
more generally pairwise interaction rules, correspond to games.
We show that restricting to asymetric games is not really a restric-
tion: all predicates computable by protocols can actually be computed
by protocols corresponding to games, i.e. any semi-linear predicate can
be computed by a Pavlovian population multi-protocol.
1 Introduction
The computational power of networks of anonymous resource-limited mo-
bile agents has been investigated recently. Angluin et al. proposed in [3] the
model of population protocols where finitely many finite-state agents interact
in pairs chosen by an adversary. Each interaction has the effect of updating
the state of the two agents according to a joint transition function. A proto-
col is said to (stably) compute a predicate on the initial states of the agents
if, in any fair execution, after finitely many interactions, all agents reach a
common output that corresponds to the value of the predicate.
The model has been originally proposed to model computations realized
by sensor networks in which passive agents are carried along by other enti-
ties. Variants of the original model considered so far include restriction to
one-way communications [1], restriction to particular interaction graphs [2],
random interactions [3], with “speed” [7]. Various kinds of fault tolerance
have been considered for population protocols [10], including the search for
self-stabilizing solutions [5]. Solutions to classical problems of distributed
algorithms have also been considered in this model (see [18]).
Most of the works so far on population protocols have concentrated on
characterizing which predicates on the initial states can be computed in
different variants of the model and under various assumptions [18]. In par-
ticular, the predicates computable by the unrestricted population protocols
from [3] have been characterized as being precisely the semi-linear predicates,
that is those predicates on counts of input agents definable in first-order
Presburger arithmetic [3, 4].
In an orthogonal way, pairwise interactions between finite-state agents
are sometimes motivated by the study of the dynamics of particular two-
player games from game theory. For example, the work in [11] considers
the dynamics of the so-called PAVLOV behavior in the iterated Prisoners’
Dilemma. Several results about the time of convergence of this particular
dynamics towards the stable state can be found in [11], and [12], for rings,
and complete graphs [16] with having various classes of adversarial sched-
ulers [15].
Our purpose is to better understand whether and when pairwise inter-
actions, and hence population protocols, can be considered as the result of
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a game. We prove the result that restricting to games is not really a re-
striction: all predicates computable by protocols can actually be computed
by protocols corresponding to games, i.e. any semi-linear predicate can be
computed by a Pavlovian population multi-protocol.
In Section 2, we recall population protocols. In Section 3, we give some
basics from game theory. In Section 4, we discuss how a game can be
turned into a dynamics, and introduce the notion of Pavlovian population.
In Section 5 we state our main result: any semi-linear predicate can be
computed by a Pavlovian population multi-protocol. Remaining sections
correspond to its proof: we prove that threshold and modulo predicates can
be computed respectively in Sections 6 and 7.
Related Works. As we already said, population protocols have been intro-
duced in [3], and proved to compute all semi-linear predicates. They have
been proved not to be able to compute more in [4]. Various restrictions on
the initial model have been considered up to now. An survey can be found
in [18].
More generally, population protocols arise as soon as populations of
anonymous agents interact in pairs. Our original motivation was to con-
sider rules corresponding to two-player games, and population protocols
arose quite incidentally. The main advantage of the [3] settings is that it
provides a clear understanding of what is called a computation by the model.
Many distributed systems have been described as the result of games, but
as far as we know there has not been attempt to characterize what can be
computed by games in the spirit of this computational model.
In this paper, we turn two players games into dynamics over agents, by
considering PAVLOV behavior. This is inspired by [11, 12, 17] that consider
the dynamics of a particular set of rules termed the PAVLOV behavior in
the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma. The PAVLOV behavior is sometimes also
termed WIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT [19, 6]. Notice, that we extended it from
two-strategies two-player games to n-strategies two-player games, whereas
above references only talk about two-strategies two-player games, and mostly
of the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma. This is clearly not the only way to asso-
ciate a dynamic to a game. Alternatives to PAVLOV behavior could include
MYOPIC dynamics (at each step each player chooses the best response to
previously played strategy by its adversary), or the well-known and stud-
ied FICTIOUS-PLAYER dynamics (at each step each player chooses the
best response to the statistics of the past history of strategies played by its
adversary). We refer to [13, 8] for a presentation of results known about
the properties of the obtained dynamics according to the properties of the
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underlying game. This is clearly non-exhaustive, and we refer to [6] for a
zoology of possible behaviors for the particular iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma
game, with discussions of their compared merits.
Recently Jaggard et al. [16] studied a distributed model similar to proto-
col populations where the interactions between pairs of agents correspond to
a game. Unlike in our model, each agent has there its own pay-off matrix and
has some knowledge of the history. This work gives several non-convergence
results.
In this paper we consider possibly asymmetric games. In a recent paper
[9] we discussed population protocols corresponding to Pavlovian strategies
obtained from symmetric games and we gave some protocols to compute
some basic predicates. Unlike what we obtain here, where we prove that any
computable predicate is computable by a asymmetric Pavlovian population
protocol, restricting to symmetric games seems a (too) strong restriction
and most predicates (e.g. counting up to 5, to check where x = 0 mod 2)
seems not even computable.
2 Population Protocols
A protocol [3] is given by (Q,Σ, ι, ω, δ) with the following components. Q
is a finite set of states. Σ is a finite set of input symbols. ι : Σ → Q is the
initial state mapping, and ω : Q→ {0, 1} is the individual output function.
δ ⊆ Q4 is a joint transition relation that describes how pairs of agents can
interact. Relation δ is sometimes described by listing all possible interactions
using the notation (q1, q2) → (q
′
1, q
′
2), or even the notation q1q2 → q
′
1q
′
2,
for (q1, q2, q
′
1, q
′
2) ∈ δ (with the convention that (q1, q2) → (q1, q2) when
no rule is specified with (q1, q2) in the left-hand side). The protocol is
termed deterministic if for all pairs (q1, q2) there is only one pair (q
′
1, q
′
2)
with (q1, q2) → (q
′
1, q
′
2). In that case, we write δ1(q1, q2) for the unique q
′
1
and δ2(q1, q2) for the unique q
′
2.
Computations of a protocol proceed in the following way. The compu-
tation takes place among n agents, where n ≥ 2. A configuration of the
system can be described by a vector of all the agents’ states. The state of
each agent is an element of Q. Because agents with the same states are
indistinguishable, each configuration can be summarized as an unordered
multiset of states, and hence of elements of Q. Each agent is given initially
some input value from Σ: Each agent’s initial state is determined by ap-
plying ι to its input value. This determines the initial configuration of the
population.
An execution of a protocol proceeds from the initial configuration by
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interactions between pairs of agents. Suppose that two agents in state q1
and q2 meet and have an interaction. They can change into state q
′
1 and
q′2 if (q1, q2, q
′
1, q
′
2) is in the transition relation δ. If C and C
′ are two con-
figurations, we write C → C ′ if C ′ can be obtained from C by a single
interaction of two agents: this means that C contains two states q1 and
q2 and C
′ is obtained by replacing q1 and q2 by q
′
1 and q
′
2 in C, where
(q1, q2, q
′
1, q
′
2) ∈ δ. An execution of the protocol is an infinite sequence
of configurations C0, C1, C2, · · · , where C0 is an initial configuration and
Ci → Ci+1 for all i ≥ 0. An execution is fair if for every configuration C
that appears infinitely often in the execution, if C → C ′ for some configura-
tion C ′, then C ′ appears infinitely often in the execution. As proved in [4],
the fairness condition implies that any global configuration that is infinitely
often reachable is eventually reached.
At any point during an execution, each agent’s state determines its out-
put at that time. If the agent is in state q, its output value is ω(q). The
configuration output is 0 (resp. 1) if all the individual outputs are 0 (resp.
1). If the individual outputs are mixed 0s and 1s then the output of the
configuration is undefined.
Let p be a predicate over multisets of elements of Σ. Predicate p can
be considered as a function whose range is {0, 1} and whose domain is the
collection of these multisets. The predicate is said to be computed by the
protocol if, for every multiset I, and every fair execution that starts from
the initial configuration corresponding to I, the output value of every agent
eventually stabilizes to p(I). Predicates can also be considered as functions
whose range is {0, 1} and whose domain is N|Σ|. The following is then known.
Theorem 1 ([3, 4]) A predicate is computable in the population protocol
model if and only if it is semilinear.
Recall that semilinear sets are exactly the sets that are definable in first-
order Presburger arithmetic [20].
3 Game Theory
We now recall the simplest concepts from Game Theory. We focus on non-
cooperative games, with complete information, in normal form.
The simplest game is made up of two players, called I (or initiator) and
R (or responder), with a finite set of actions, called pure strategies, Strat(I)
and Strat(R). Denote by Ai,j (resp. Bi,j) the score for player I (resp.
R) when I uses strategy i ∈ Strat(I) and R uses strategy j ∈ Strat(R).
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The scores are given by n ×m matrices A and B, where n and m are the
cardinality of Strat(I) and Strat(R).
A strategy x in Strat(I) is said to be a best response to strategy y in
Strat(R), denoted by x ∈ BRA(y) if Az,y ≤ Ax,y for all strategies z ∈
Strat(I). Conversely, a strategy y ∈ Strat(R) satisfies y ∈ BRB(x) if
Bx,z ≤ Bx,y for all strategies z ∈ Strat(R). A pair (x, y) is a (pure) Nash
equilibrium if x ∈ BRA(y) and y ∈ BRB(x). In other words, two strategies
(x, y) form a Nash equilibrium if in that state neither of the players has a
unilateral interest to deviate from it.
There are two main approaches to discuss dynamics of games. The first
consists in repeating games [8]. The second in using models from evolution-
ary game theory. Refer to [14, 21] for a presentation of this latter approach.
Repeating k times a game, is equivalent to extending the space of actions
into Strat(I)k and Strat(R)k: player I (respectively R) chooses his or her
action x(t) ∈ Strat(I), (resp. y(t) ∈ Strat(R)) at time t for t = 1, 2, · · · , k.
This is equivalent to a two-player game with respectively nk and mk choices
for players.
In practice, player I (respectively R) has to solve the following problem
at each time t: given the history of the game up to now, that is to say
Xt−1 = x(1), · · · ,x(t−1) and Yt−1 = y(1), · · · ,y(t−1) what should I (resp.
R) play at time t? In other words, how to choose x(t) ∈ Strat(I)? (resp.
y(t) ∈ Strat(R)?)
Is is natural to suppose that this is given by some behavior rules: x(t) =
f(Xt−1, Yt−1) and y(t) = g(Xt−1, Yt−1) for some particular functions f and
g.
The question of the best behavior rule to use in games, in particular for
the Prisoners’ Dilemma gave birth to an important literature. In particular,
after the book [6], that describes the results of tournaments of behavior rules
for the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, and that argues that there exists a best
behavior rule called TIT − FOR − TAT . This consists in cooperating at
the first step, and then do the same thing as the adversary at subsequent
times. A lot of other behaviors, most of them with very picturesque names
have been proposed and studied: see for example [6].
Among possible behaviors there is PAVLOV behavior: in the iterated
Prisoners’ Dilemma, a player cooperates if and only if both players opted
for the same alternative in the previous move. This name [6, 17, 19] stems
from the fact that this strategy embodies an almost reflex-like response to the
payoff: it repeats its former move if it was rewarded above a threshold value,
but switches behavior if it was punished by receiving under this value. Refer
to [19] for some study of this strategy in the spirit of Axelrod’s tournaments.
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The PAVLOV behavior can also be termedWIN-STAY, LOSE-SHIFT since
if the play on the previous round results in a success, then the agent plays
the same strategy on the next round. Alternatively, if the play resulted in a
failure the agent switches to another action [6, 19].
4 From Games To Population Protocols
In the spirit of the previous discussion, to any game, we can associate a
population protocol as follows, corresponding to a PAVLOV (ian) behaviour:
Definition 1 (Associating a Protocol to a Game) Assume a (possibly
asymmetric) two-player game is given. Let A and B be the corresponding
matrices. Let ∆ be some threshold.
The protocol associated to the game is a population protocol whose set of
states is Q, where Q = Strat(I) = Strat(R) is the set of strategies of the
game, and whose transition rules δ are given as follows: (q1, q2, q
′
1, q
′
2) ∈ δ
where
• q′1 = q1 when Aq1,q2 ≥ ∆,
• q′1 ∈ BRA(q2) when Aq1,q2 < ∆,
• q′2 = q2 when Bq2,q1 ≥ ∆,
• q′2 ∈ BRB(q1) when Bq2,q1 < ∆.
Definition 2 (Pavlovian Population Protocol) A population protocol is
Pavlovian if it can be obtained from a game as above.
A population protocol obtained from a game as above will be termed
deterministic if best responses are assumed to be unique; in this case, the
rules are deterministic: for all q1, q2, there is a unique q
′
1 and a unique q
′
2
such that (q1, q2, q
′
1, q
′
2) ∈ δ.
In order to avoid to talk about matrices, we start by stating some struc-
tural properties of Pavlovian population protocols.
Proposition 1 Consider a set of rules. For all rules ab → a′b′, we denote
δIa(b) = b
′ and δRb (a) = a
′. Let StableI(a) = {x ∈ Q|δIa(x) = x}, and
StableR(a) = {x ∈ Q|δRa (x) = x}.
Then the set of rules is deterministic Pavlovian iff ∀a ∈ Q ∃ maxI(a) ∈
StableI(a) and ∃ maxR(a) ∈ StableR(a) such that for all states a,
1. ∀b 6∈ StableI(a) implies δIa(b) = max
I(a).
2. ∀b 6∈ StableR(a) implies δRa (b) = max
R(a).
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Proof: First, we consider a Pavlovian population protocol P obtained
from corresponding matrices A and B. Let ∆ be the associated threshold.
Let a be an arbitrary state in Q, and let q be the best response to strategy
a for matrix B.
Focus on the rule aq → a′q′ where (a′, q′) ∈ Q2, i.e., focus on the case
where player I plays a while player R plays q. As q = BRB(a), we have, by
Definition 1, q′ equals to q. Thus, q ∈ StableI(a).
Now, let consider b such that b /∈ StableI(a). We focus on the rule
ab → a′′b′ where (a′′, b′) ∈ Q2. So by definition of set StableI , we have
b 6= b′. Using Definition 1, we have Bb,a < ∆ and b
′ = BRB(a). So
b′ = BRB(a) = q. Thus, if we let max
I(a) = q, maxI(a) satisfies the
conditions of the proposition.
Using similar arguments, we can also prove that ∃maxR(a) ∈ StableR(a)
such that ∀b 6∈ StableR(a) implies δIa(b) = max
R(a). In fact, we can sum
up the relationship between the game matrix and rules by the following:
for any a ∈ Q, we have StableI(a) = {x ∈ Q|Bx,a ≥ ∆} ∪ {BRB(a)} and
maxI(a) = BRB(a) and Stable
R(a) = {x ∈ Q|Ax,a ≥ ∆} ∪ {BRA(a)} and
maxR(a) = BRA(a).
Conversely, consider a population protocol P satisfying the properties of
the proposition. All rules ab→ a′b′ are such that δIa(b) = b
′ and δRb (a) = a
′.
We focus on the construction on a two-player game having the corresponding
matrices A, and B. We fix an arbitrary value ∆ as the threshold of the
corresponding game.
• If StableI(a) 6= Q, then BmaxI (a),a = ∆ + 1. If x ∈ Stable
I(a) and if
x 6= maxI(a) then Bx,a = ∆. If x /∈ Stable
I(a), then Bx,a = ∆− 1.
• If StableI(a) = Q, then ∀x ∈ Q, Bx,a = ∆.
• If StableR(a) 6= Q, then AmaxR(a),a = ∆+ 1. If x ∈ Stable
R(a) and if
x 6= maxR(a) then Ax,a = ∆. If x /∈ Stable
R(a), then Ax,a = ∆− 1.
• If StableR(a) = Q, then ∀x ∈ Q, Ax,a = ∆.
It is easy to see that this game describes all rules of P . So, P is a Pavlovian
population Protocol. 
5 Main Result
Inverting value of the individual output function, the class of predicates com-
putable by a Pavlovian population protocol is clearly closed under negation.
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However, this is not clear that predicates computable by Pavlovian popula-
tion protocols are closed under conjunction or disjunction.
This is true if one considers multi-protocol. The idea is to consider k
(possibly asymmetric) two-player games. At each step, each player chooses
a strategy for each of the k games. Now each of the k games is played
independently when two agents meet. Formally:
Definition 3 (Multiprotocol) Consider k (possibly asymmetric) two-player
games. For game i, let Qi be the corresponding states, Ai and Bi the corre-
sponding matrices.
The associated population protocol is the population protocol whose set
of states is Q = Q1 × Q2 × . . . × Qk, and whose transition rules are given
as follows: ((q11 , . . . , q
k
1 ), (q
1
2 , . . . , q
k
2 ), (q
1
1
′
, . . . , qk1
′
), (q12
′
, . . . , qk1
′
)) ∈ δ where,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, (qi1, q
i
2, q
i
1
′
, qi2
′
) is a transition of the Pavlovian population
protocol associated to the ith game.
Notice that, when considering population protocols, a multi-protocol is
a particular population protocol. This is the key property used in [3] to
prove that stably computable predicates are closed under boolean opera-
tions. When considering Pavlovian games, one can build multi-protocols
that are not Pavlovian protocols, and it is not clear whether one can al-
ways transform any pavlovian multi-protocol into an equivalent pavlovian
protocol.
As explained before, multisets of elements of Σ = (σ1, . . . , σl) are in bi-
jection with elements of Nl, and can be represented by a vector (x1, . . . , xl)
of non-negative integers where xi is the number of occurrences of σi in the
multiset. Thus, we consider predicates ψ over vectors of non-negative in-
tegers. We write [ψ] for their characteristic functions. Recall that a pred-
icate is semi-linear iff it is Presburger definable [20]. Semi-linear predicate
correspond to boolean combinations of threshold predicates and modulo
predicates defined as follows (variables xi represent the number of agents
initially in state σi): A threshold predicate is of the form [Σaixi ≥ k], where
∀i, ai ∈ Z, k ∈ Z and the xis are variables. A modulo predicate is of the
form [Σaixi ≡ b mod k], where ∀i, ai ∈ Z, k ∈ N \ {0, 1}, b ∈ [1, k − 1] and
the xis are variables.
We can then state our main result:
Theorem 2 For any predicate ψ, the following conditions are equivalent:
• ψ is computable by a population protocol
• ψ is computable by a Pavlovian population multi-protocol
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• ψ is semi-linear.
The proof of the following proposition can be found in Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2 The class of predicates computable by multi-games are closed
under boolean operations.
As from Proposition 2, predicates computable by Pavlovian population
multi-protocols are closed under boolean operations, and as a Pavlovian pop-
ulation protocol is a particular Pavlovian population multi-protocol, and as
predicates computable by (general) population protocols are known to be ex-
actly semi-linear predicates, to prove Theorem 2 we only need to prove that
we can compute threshold predicates and modulo predicates by Pavlovian
population protocols. This is the purpose of the following sections.
6 Threshold Predicates
In this section, we prove that we can compute threshold predicates using
Pavlovian protocols.
Proposition 3 For any integer k, and any integers a1, a2, · · · , am there
exists a Pavlovian population protocol that computes [
∑m
i=1 aixi ≥ k].
First note, that we can assume without loss of generality that k ≥ 1.
Indeed, [Σaixi ≥ −k] = [Σ(−ai)xi ≤ k] = [Σ(−ai)xi < k + 1] which is the
negation of [Σ(−ai)xi ≥ k+1]. Thus from a population protocol computing
[Σ(−ai)xi ≥ k + 1] with k ≥ 0, we just have to inverse the output function
to obtain a population protocol that computes [Σaixi ≥ −k].
The purpose of the rest of this section is to prove Proposition 3. We first
discuss some basic ideas: Our techniques are inspired by the work of Angluin
et al. [1]. The set of states we use is the set of integers from [−M,M ] where
M = max(|ai|, 2k−1). Each agent with input σi is given an initial weight of
ai. During the execution, the sum of the weights over the whole population
is preserved. In [4], the general idea is the following: two interacting agents
with positive weights p and q such that p+ q ≤M are transformed into an
agent with weight 0 and an agent with weight p + q, while two agents with
weight p and q such that p + q > M are transformed into two agents with
weight ⌊(p + q)/2⌋ and ⌈(p + q)/2⌉ that are both greater or equal to k.
In our setting, we cannot use the same rules since all agents that change
their states when they meet an agent in state p while being initiator (resp.
responder) must take the same state that only depends of p. To avoid this
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problem, a trick is to use rules of the following form: pq → (p + 1)(q − 1).
However, we also have to make sure that the protocol enables all agents to
agree in the final configuration. Whereas this kind of consideration is easy
in the classical population protocol model, this turns out to be tricky in our
settings.
We describe a protocol that computes [
∑m
i=1 aixi ≥ k]. Our protocol is
defined as follows: we consider Σ = {σ1, . . . , σl}, Q = {⊤} ∪ [−M,M ]; for
all i, ι(σi) = ai; and we take ω(⊤) = 1 and for any p ∈ [−M,M ], ω(p) = 1
if and only if p ≥ 1.
We distinguish two cases: either k = 1, or k ≥ 2. We present two
protocols here, because we need to have a mechanism in our protocols to
enable to “broadcast” the result; this is not so difficult in the first case
whereas it is more technical in the second one. Due to lack of space, we
only give the rules for k = 1 (the proof can be found in Appendix A.2), but
provide a full proof for the case k ≥ 2.
Case k = 1. Our protocol computing [Σaixi ≥ 1] is defined as follows (see
Appendix A.2). The rules are the following.
⊤⊤→⊤⊤
1⊤→1⊤
∀n ∈ [−M, 0], ∀p ∈ [2,M − 1]
n⊤→ n0
nx→ nx ∀x ∈ [−M,M ],
⊤x→ ⊤x ∀x ∈ [−M,M ]
1n→ (n+ 1)⊤ ∀n ∈ [−M, 0]
1p→ 1p ∀p ∈ [1,M ]
p⊤→ p⊤
pn→(n+ 1)(p− 1)
pp′→ pp′ ∀p′ ∈ [1,M ]
Case k ≥ 2. Our protocol is deterministic and from Proposition 1 uniquely
determined by the sets StableI(q), StableR(q), and by the values maxI(q),
maxR(q) defined as follows.
q ∈ Q StableI(q) maxI(q) StableR(q) maxR(q)
⊤ {⊤} ∪ [−M, 0] ∪ [k,M ] −1 {⊤} ∪ [−M,M ]
n ∈ [−M,−1] [−M,M ] 0 {⊤} ∪ [−M, 0] (n+ 1)
0 [−M,M ] 0 {⊤} ∪ [−M,k − 1] 1
1 {⊤, 0,M} ⊤ [−M, 0] 2
p ∈ [2, k − 1] {⊤, 0,M} (p− 1) [−M, 0] (p+ 1)
b ∈ [k,M − 1] {⊤} ∪ [k,M ] (b− 1) {⊤} ∪ [−M, 0] ∪ [k,M ] (b+ 1)
M {⊤} ∪ [k,M ] (M − 1) {⊤} ∪ [−M,M ]
The transition rules we obtain from these sets and values are the follow-
ing.
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⊤⊤→ ⊤⊤
⊤p→ (p+ 1)(−1) ∀p ∈ [1, k − 1]
1⊤→ 1⊤
1x→ (x+ 1)⊤ ∀x /∈ {⊤, 0,M}
∀p ∈ [2, k − 1]
p⊤→ p⊤
p0→ p0
∀n ∈ [−M, 0]
n⊤→ n0
∀b ∈ [k,M ]
b⊤→ b⊤
bx→(x + 1)(b− 1) ∀x ∈ [−M,k − 1]
⊤x→⊤x ∀x ∈ [−M, 0] ∪ [k,M ]
10→10
1M→1M
px→(x+ 1)(p− 1) ∀x /∈ {⊤, 0,M}
pM→pM
nx→nx ∀x ∈ [−M,M ]
bb′ →bb′ ∀b′ ∈ [k,M ]
We say that an agent in state x ∈ [−M,M ] has weight x and that an
agent in state ⊤ has weight 0. Note that in the initial configuration the sum
of the weights of all agents is exactly Σaixi. Note that any of the rule of
our protocol does not modify the total weight of the population, i.e., at any
step of the execution, the sum of the weights of all agents is exactly Σaixi.
Note that the stable configurations, (i.e., the configurations where no
rule can be applied to modify the state of any agent), are the following:
• every agent a is in some state n(a) ∈ [−M, 0],
• a unique agent is in state p ∈ [1, k − 1] and every other agent is in
state 0.
• every agent a is either in some state b(a) ∈ [k,M ] or in state ⊤.
Note that no agent starts in state ⊤, and that no rule enables the two
interacting agents to enter the state ⊤ except for the rule ⊤⊤ → ⊤⊤. Thus,
we know that it is impossible that all agents are in state ⊤. Consequently,
in the last case described, we know that there is at least one agent in a state
b ∈ [k,M ].
Note that in any stable configuration, all agents have the same output;
if Σaixi ≥ k then all agents output 1, while in all the other cases, the agents
output 0. Thus, if the population reaches a stable configuration, we know
that the computed output is correct and that it will not be modified any
more. Now, we should prove that the fairness condition ensures that we
always reach a stable configuration. In fact, it is sufficient to prove that
from any reachable configuration, there exists an execution that reaches a
stable configuration.
Consider any configuration reached during the execution. As long as
there is an agent in state p ∈ [1,M ] and an agent in state n ∈ [−M,−1], we
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apply pn→ (n+1)(p− 1). Thus we can always reach a configuration where
the states of all agents are in [−M, 0]∪ {⊤} if Σaixi ≤ 0, or in [0,M ] ∪ {⊤}
otherwise.
If Σaixi ≤ 0, then there is at least one agent in state n ∈ [−M, 0], since
all agents cannot be in state ⊤. In this case, applying iteratively the rule
n⊤ → n0, we reach a stable configuration where all agents have a state in
[−M, 0].
Suppose now that Σaixi ∈ [1, k− 1]. Since Σaixi ∈ [1, k − 1], each agent
with a positive weight is in a state in [1, k − 1]. Applying iteratively the
rule pp′ → (p − 1)(p′ + 1) where p, p′ ∈ [1, k − 1], we reach a configuration
where there is exactly one agent in state p ∈ [1, k − 1] while all the other
agents are in state 0 or ⊤. Applying iteratively the rules ⊤p→ (p+ 1)(−1)
and (p+ 1)(−1) → 0p, we reach a configuration where one agent is in state
p ∈ [1, k − 1] while all the other agents are in state 0.
Finally, assume that Σaixi ≥ k. If there is an agent in state p ∈ [1, k−1],
we know that there is at least another agent in state q ∈ [1,M ]. If p+q ≤M ,
applying iteratively the rule pq → (p − 1)(q + 1) between these two agents,
we reach a configuration where one of these two agents is in state 0 while the
other is in state p + q. In this case, we have strictly reduced the number of
agents in a state in [1, k−1]. If p+q > M ≥ 2k, then q ∈ [k,M ], and applying
iteratively the rule qp→ (q − 1)(p+ 1), we reach a configuration where one
agent is in state k while the other agent is in state p+ q− k ∈ [k, 2M ]. Here
again, we have strictly reduced the number of agents in a state in [1, k − 1].
Applying these rules as long as there exists an agent in state p ∈ [1, k − 1],
we reach a configuration where all agents are either in a state in [k,M ], or
in state 0 or ⊤. Since Σaixi ∈ [k,M ], we know there exists an agent in state
b ∈ [k,M ]. Applying iteratively the rules b0→ 1(b− 1) and 1(b− 1)→ b⊤,
we reach a stable configuration where all agents are either in state ⊤ or in
a state in [k,M ].
7 Modulo Counting
Proposition 4 For any integers k, b, and any integers a1, a2, · · · , am there
exists a Pavlovian population protocol that computes [
∑m
i=1 aixi ≡ b mod k].
Due to lack of space, we only give the rules of the protocol for the case
when b ∈ [1, k− 1] (see Appendix A.3 for the complete proof). In that case,
our protocol is defined as follows: Σ = {σ1, . . . , σl}, Q = {⊤} ∪ [0, k − 1];
for all i, let ι(σi) ≡ ai mod k; let ω(⊤) = 1 and for any p ∈ [0, k − 1], let
ω(p) = 1 if and only if p = b.
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The rules are the following:
⊤⊤ → ⊤⊤
b⊤ → b⊤
0⊤ → 0⊤
∀p ∈ [1, k − 1]
⊤p → ⊤p
p(k − 1)→⊤(p− 1)
∀p ∈ [0, k − 1] \ {b}
0p → 0p
⊤0→ 00
0b→ ⊤(k − 1) if b = k − 1
0b→ (b + 1)(k − 1) if b 6= k − 1
pp′→ pp′ ∀p′ ∈ [0, p− 1]
pp′→(p′ + 1)(p− 1) ∀p′ ∈ [p, k − 2]
p⊤→ 1(p− 1)
8 Conclusion
In this work, we present some (original an non-trivial) Pavlovian population
protocols that compute the general threshold and modulo predicates. From
this, we deduced that a predicate is computable in the Pavlovian population
multi-protocol model if and only if it is semilinear.
In other words, we proved that restricting to rules that correspond to
asymmetric games in pairwise interactions is not a restriction.
We however needed to consider multi-protocols, that is to say multi-
games. We conjecture that the Pavlovian population protocols (i.e. non-
multi-protocol) can not compute all semilinear predicates. A point is that
in such protocols the set of rules are very limited (see Proposition 1). In
particular, it seems rather impossible to perform an “or” operation between
two modulo predicates in the general case.
Notice that the hypothesis of asymmetric games seems also necessary.
We studied symmetric Pavlovian population protocols in [9] where we demon-
strated that some non-trivial predicates can be computed. However, even
very basic predicates, like the threshold predicate counting up to 5, seems
problematic to be computed by symmetric games. With asymmetric games,
general threshold and modulo predicates can be computed.
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A Proofs
The following proofs are here for completeness of the refereeing process.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The negation is easy to deal with, as we just need to change ω into 1 − ω.
From de Morgan’s laws, we only need to prove closure by conjunction.
For the conjunction of two multi-games, let consider the multi-game in-
cluding all the games present in the two initial multi-games. The conjunction
protocol is the one associated to the new multi-game with output function
ω′(q1, . . . , qk, p1, . . . , pl) = ω1(q
1, . . . , qk) ∗ ω2(p
1, . . . , pl),
where (q1, . . . , qk) and (p1, . . . , pl) are the corresponding games in the first
and second multi-games, and ω1 and ω2 the respective output functions.
A.2 Proof of Our Protocol for Threshold Predicates when
k = 1
Our protocol computing [Σaixi ≥ 1] is defined as follows:
• Σ = {σ1, . . . , σl}.
• Q = {⊤} ∪ [−M,M ], where ⊤ corresponds to a weight of 0 but has a
different output meaning than the state 0.
• ι(σi) = ai.
• ω(⊤) = 1 and for any p ∈ [−M,M ], ω(p) = 1 if and only if p ≥ 1.
Our protocol is deterministic and from Proposition 1 uniquely deter-
mined by the sets StableI(q), StableR(q), and by the valuesmaxI(q),maxR(q)
defined as follows.
q ∈ Q StableI(q) maxI(q) StableR(q) maxR(q)
⊤ {⊤} ∪ [−M,M ] {⊤} ∪ [−M,M ]
n ∈ [−M,−1] [−M,M ] 0 {⊤} ∪ [−M, 0] (n+ 1)
0 [−M,M ] 0 {⊤} ∪ [−M, 1] 1
1 {⊤} ∪ [1,M ] ⊤ {⊤} ∪ [−M,M ]
p ∈ [2,M ] {⊤} ∪ [1,M ] (p − 1) {⊤} ∪ [−M,M ]
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The transition rules we obtain from these sets and values are the follow-
ing.
⊤⊤→⊤⊤
1⊤→1⊤
∀n ∈ [−M, 0],∀p ∈ [2,M − 1]
n⊤→ n0
nx→ nx ∀x ∈ [−M,M ],
⊤x→ ⊤x ∀x ∈ [−M,M ]
1n→ (n+ 1)⊤ ∀n ∈ [−M, 0]
1p→ 1p ∀p ∈ [1,M ]
p⊤→ p⊤
pn→(n+ 1)(p − 1)
pp′→ pp′ ∀p′ ∈ [1,M ]
We say that an agent in state x ∈ [−M,M ] has weight x and that an
agent in state ⊤ has weight 0. Note that in the initial configuration the sum
of the weights of all agents is exactly Σaixi. Note that any of the rule of
our protocol does not modify the total weight of the population, i.e., at any
step of the execution, the sum of the weights of all agents is exactly Σaixi.
Note that the stable configurations, (i.e., the configurations where no
rule can be applied to modify the state of some agent), are the following:
• each agent a is in some state n(a) ∈ [−M, 0],
• each agent a is either in some state p(a) ∈ [1,M ] or in state ⊤.
Note that no agent starts in state ⊤, and that no rule enables the two
interacting agents to enter the state ⊤ except for the rule ⊤⊤ → ⊤⊤. Thus,
we know that it is impossible that all agents are in state ⊤. Consequently,
in the last case described, we know that there is at least one agent in a state
p ∈ [1,M ].
Note that in any stable configuration, all agents have the same output;
if Σaixi ≥ 1 then all agents output 1, while in all the other cases, the agents
output 0.
Thus, if the population reaches a stable configuration, we know that
the computed output is correct and that it will not be modified any more.
Now, we should prove that the fairness condition ensures that we always
reach a stable configuration. In fact, it is sufficient to prove that from
any reachable configuration, there exists an execution that reaches a stable
configuration. Indeed, since the number of configurations is finite, it means
that in any execution, there is a stable configuration S such that from any
reachable configuration, S is reachable. The fairness condition ensures that
S is eventually reached.
We now show that from any configuration, there exists an execution that
leads to a stable configuration.
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Consider any configuration reached during the execution. As long as
there is an agent in state p ∈ [1,M ] and an agent in state n ∈ [−M,−1], we
apply pn→ (n+1)(p− 1). Thus we can always reach a configuration where
the states of all agents are in [−M, 0]∪ {⊤} if Σaixi ≤ 0, or in [0,M ] ∪ {⊤}
otherwise.
If Σaixi ≤ 0, then there is at least one agent in state n ∈ [−M, 0], since
all agents cannot be in state ⊤. In this case, applying iteratively the rule
n⊤ → n0, we reach a stable configuration where all agents have a state in
[−M, 0].
If Σaixi ≥ 1, then there is at least one agent in state p ∈ [1,M ]. If there
is an agent in state 0, we apply the following rules. If there is no agent in
state 1, we apply a rule p0 → 1(p − 1) for p ∈ [2,M ] to create a 1. Then,
applying iteratively the rule 10→ 1⊤, we reach a stable configuration where
each agent is either in a state in [1,M ], or is in state ⊤.
This ends the proof of Proposition 3 when k = 1.
A.3 Proof of Our Protocol for Modulo Counting
Here again, we use rules of the form np→ (n+ 1)(p − 1) mod k so that at
the end of the computation there is only one node with a non-zero weight.
We should also add some rules to be able to ensure the “broadcast” of the
result among the agents. We consider two cases, depending on whether b is
equal to zero or not.
A.3.1 Case b ∈ [1, k − 1].
Our protocol is defined as follows:
• Σ = {σ1, . . . , σl}.
• Q = {⊤} ∪ [0, k − 1], where ⊤ corresponds to a weight of 0 but has a
different output meaning than the state 0.
• ι(σi) ≡ ai mod k.
• ω(⊤) = 1 and for any p ∈ [0, k − 1], ω(p) = 1 if and only if p = b.
Our protocol is deterministic and from Proposition 1 uniquely deter-
mined by the sets StableI(q), StableR(q), and by the valuesmaxI(q),maxR(q)
defined as follows. In the following table, when p = k − 1 (resp. b = k − 1),
p+ 1 (resp. b+ 1) should be understand as ⊤.
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q ∈ Q StableI(q) maxI(q) StableR(q) maxR(q)
⊤ Q {⊤, 0, b} 1
0 Q \ {b} (k − 1) [0, k − 1] 0
b {⊤} ∪ [0, b − 1] (b− 1) {⊤} ∪ [b+ 1, k − 1] (b+ 1)
p ∈ [1, k − 1] \ {b} [0, p − 1] (p− 1) {⊤, 0} ∪ [p+ 1, k − 1] (p+ 1)
The transition rules we obtain from these sets and values are the follow-
ing.
⊤⊤ → ⊤⊤
b⊤ → b⊤
0⊤ → 0⊤
∀p ∈ [1, k − 1]
⊤p → ⊤p
p(k − 1)→⊤(p− 1)
∀p ∈ [0, k − 1] \ {b}
0p → 0p
⊤0→ 00
0b→ ⊤(k − 1) if b = k − 1
0b→ (b+ 1)(k − 1) if b 6= k − 1
pp′→ pp′ ∀p′ ∈ [0, p − 1]
pp′→(p′ + 1)(p − 1) ∀p′ ∈ [p, k − 2]
p⊤→ 1(p − 1)
Note that in the initial configuration the sum of the weights of all agents
is exactly Σaixi mod k. Note that the application of any rule of our protocol
does not modify this value, i.e., at any step of the execution, the sum of the
weights of all agents is exactly Σaixi mod k.
Note that the stable configurations, (i.e., the configurations where no
rule can be applied to modify the state of some agent), are the following:
• there exists a unique agent in state b and all other agents are in state
⊤.
• there exists at most one agent in state p ∈ [1, k− 1] \ {b} and all other
agents are in state 0.
As in the protocols for threshold predicates, no rule can transform the
states of two interacting agents into ⊤ except for the rule ⊤⊤ → ⊤⊤. Since
initially, no agent is in state ⊤, it is impossible to reach a configuration
where all agents are in state ⊤.
In any stable configuration, either all agents output 1 (if Σaixi ≡ b
mod k), or all agents output 0. We now show that from any reachable
configuration, we can reach a stable configuration.
As long as there are two agents in states p, p′ ∈ [1, k − 1] with p ≤ p′,
we can apply iteratively the rule pp′ → (p′ + 1)(p − 1) between these two
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agents. Doing so, either one agent enters state 0, or one agent is in state
k − 1, while the other is in state p′′ ∈ [1, k − 1]. In the latter case, applying
the rule p(k − 1)→ ⊤(p− 1), we also decrease the number of agents with a
positive weight by 1. Thus, we can always reach a configuration where there
is at most one agent a in state p ∈ [1, k − 1], while all the other agents are
in state 0 or ⊤.
If Σaixi ≡ 0 mod k, then all agents are in state 0 or ⊤, and we know
there is at least one agent in state 0. Applying as long as necessary the rule
⊤0→ 00, we reach a stable configuration where all agents are in state 0.
If Σaixi ≡ p mod k with p ∈ [1, k − 1] \ {b} then one agent is in state p
while all the other agents are in state 0 or ⊤. If there is an agent in state ⊤,
we apply the rule p⊤ → 1(p − 1). If p = 1, then there is one more agent in
state 0. If p > 1, we apply the rule 1(p−1)→ p0, to also get one more agent
in state 0. Iterating this process, we reach a stable configuration where one
agent is in state p while all other agents are in state 0.
If Σaixi ≡ b mod k, then one agent is in state b while all the other agents
are in state 0 or ⊤. As long as there is an agent in state 0, if b 6= k − 1, we
apply the rules 0b→ (b+1)(k− 1) and (b+1)(k− 1)→ ⊤b. If b = k− 1, we
apply the rule 0(k−1)→ ⊤(k−1). Doing so, we reach a stable configuration
where one agent is in state b while all other agents are in state ⊤.
A.3.2 Case b = 0.
If k = 2, then [Σaixi ≡ 0[2]] is the negation of [Σaixi ≡ 1[2]]. In this
case, since pavlovian protocols are closed under negation, we know from the
previous case that there is a pavlovian protocol that computes [Σaixi ≡ 0[2]].
In the following, we assume that k ≥ 3. Our protocol is defined as
follows:
• Σ = {σ1, . . . , σl}.
• Q = {A,B} ∪ [0, k − 1], where A and B corresponds to a weight of 0
but has a different output meaning than the state 0.
• ι(σi) ≡ ai mod k.
• ω(0) = 1 and for any x ∈ [1, k − 1] ∪ {A,B}, ω(x) = 0.
Our protocol is deterministic and from Proposition 1 uniquely deter-
mined by the sets StableI(q), StableR(q), and by the valuesmaxI(q),maxR(q)
defined as follows.
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q ∈ Q StableI(q) maxI(q) StableR(q) maxR(q)
A Q \ {B} 0 Q \ {B} 0
B Q \ {A} 0 Q \ {A} 0
0 {A,B, 0, 1, (k − 1)} (k − 1) [0, k − 1] 0
1 {A} A Q \ {1} 2
(k − 1) Q \ {(k − 1)} (k − 2) {B} B
p ∈ [2, k − 2] {A,B} ∪ [0, p − 1] (p− 1) {A,B} ∪ [p+ 1, k − 1] (p + 1)
The transition rules we obtain from these sets and values are the follow-
ing.
AA → AA
AB → 00
A0 → 00
Ap → Ap ∀p ∈ [1, k − 2]
A(k − 1)→B(k − 1)
BA → 00
BB → BB
B0 → 00
Bp → Bp ∀p ∈ [1, k − 1]
0x → 0x ∀x ∈ {A,B, 0, 1}
0p →(p+ 1)(k − 1) ∀p ∈ [2, k − 2]
0(k − 1)→ B(k − 1)
1x → 1A ∀x ∈ {A,B, 0}
1p → (p+ 1)A ∀p ∈ [1, k − 2]
1(k − 1)→ BA
∀p ∈ [2, k − 1]
px → px ∀x ∈ {A,B} ∪ [0, p− 1]
pn →(n+ 1)(p− 1) ∀n ∈ [p, k − 2]
p(k − 1)→ B(p− 1)
Note that in the initial configuration the sum of the weights of all agents
is exactly Σaixi mod k. Note that the application of any rule of our protocol
does not modify this value, i.e., at any step of the execution, the sum of the
weights of all agents is exactly Σaixi mod k.
Note that the stable configurations, (i.e., the configurations where no
rule can be applied to modify the state of some agent), are the following:
• all agents are in state 0.
• there exists a unique agent in state p ∈ [1, k − 2] and all other agents
are in state A.
• there exists a unique agent in state p ∈ [2, k − 1] and all other agents
are in state B.
In any stable configuration, either all agents output 1 (if Σaixi ≡ b
mod k), or all agents output 0. We now show that from any reachable
configuration, we can reach a stable configuration.
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As in the previous case, as long as there are two agents in states p, p′ ∈
[1, k − 1] with p ≤ p′, we can apply iteratively the rule pp′ → (p′ + 1)(p− 1)
between these two agents. Doing so, either one agent enters state 1, or one
agent is in state k − 1. If one agent is in state 1 while the other is in state
k− 1, we apply the rule 1(k− 1)→ BA, and we have decreased the number
of agents with a positive weight by 2. If there is one agent in state 1 (resp.
k− 1) while the other is in state p ∈ [1, k− 2] (resp. p ∈ [2, k− 1]), we apply
the rule 1p→ (p+ 1)A (resp. p(k− 1)→ B(p− 1)) to decrease the number
of agents with a positive weight. Thus, we can always reach a configuration
where there is at most one agent a in state p ∈ [1, k− 1], while all the other
agents are in state 0, A or B.
If Σaixi ≡ 0 mod k, either all agents have started in state 0 or not. In
the first case, the initial configuration was a stable configuration, and we
have nothing to prove. In the second case, the last step before we reach a
configuration containing only agents in state 0, A or B, there was one agent
in state 1, one agent in state (k − 1) and the rule 1(k − 1) → BA has been
applied. Thus, either there exists an agent in state 0 in the configuration,
or there exists an agent in state A and an agent in state B. In the latter
case, we can apply the rule AB → 00 to be in a configuration containing
agents in state 0. Then, applying the rules A0→ 00 and B0→ 00, we reach
a stable configuration where all agents are in state 0.
If Σaixi ≡ 1 mod k (resp. Σaixi ≡ k − 1 mod k), we reach a configu-
ration where there is exactly one agent in state 1 (resp. k− 1) while all the
other agents are in state 0, A or B. Then applying the rules 1B → 1A and
10→ 1B (resp. A(k − 1) → B(k− 1) and 0(k− 1)→ B(k− 1)), we reach a
stable configuration where there is exactly one agent in state 1 (resp. k− 1)
while all the other agents are in state A (resp. B).
If Σaixi ≡ p mod k with p ∈ [2, k − 2], we reach a configuration where
there is exactly one agent in state p while all the other agents are in state 0,
A or B. If the agents with weight 0 are either all in state A, or all in state
B, we are in a stable configuration. Otherwise, applying as long as possible
the rules AB → 00, 0p→ (p+ 1)(k − 1) and (p+ 1)(k − 1)→ Bp, we reach
a final configuration where exactly one agent is in state p while all the other
agents are in state B.
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